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STATE OF UTAH,
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Defendant.

;
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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S

BRIEF

ISSUES ADDRESSED IN APPELLENT'S RESPONSE BRIEF
In the Brief of Appellee, the State declared that to "establish a claim of
ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law, a defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial,
his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). The state incorrectly stated that the Defendant failed to
cite any current law that was on the books at the time of trial and was relying upon
law that was created after the trial was completed, namely Gant v. Arizona, 129
S.Ct.1710; 173 L.Ed2d 485 (April, 2009). Furthermore, in the addendum of
Appellee's brief, the State included two newspaper articles about the dangers
officers face while initiating a traffic stop. As there are multiple reasons and

[1]

exceptions to the State's assertion that "any full custodial arrest, even for a
misdemeanor traffic violation, allows an officer to conduct a highly intrusive
search of the arrested personQ... and his or her vehicle..." See Aple. Br. at 10
the Defendant feels compelled to briefly respond.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§58-37-8(2A): Prohibited Acts
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;

[2]

58-37A-5 Unlawful acts
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug
paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person
under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person making
the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
puipose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia.
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (4) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(5) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
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misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused
and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of
the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED ON THE LAW IN
[4]

EFFECT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL IN NOT SEEKING THE
SUPRESSION OF THE DRUG EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN NOT SUA
SPONTE SUPPRESSING IT.
The State erroneously contends that the "Defendant 'cites no authority in
effect at the time of trial' that would have supported a motion to suppress.'" See
Aple. Br. at 9 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 at 1228 (Utah 1993)). The State
asserts that the Defendant is solely relying on Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct.1710; 173
L.Ed2d 485 (April, 2009). Although the defendant is ethically bound to cite
relevant law when it is handed down by higher courts, even without Gant the
Defendant can show that the evidence ought to have been suppressed. There was
no need for the Defendant's trial counsel, the trial judge, or the State to predict
forthcoming law. All that was required of the Defendant's trial counsel was to
actually read current law and make an effort to apply the law to the Defendant's
case. This was not done, and the Defendant has now lost his freedom because of
trial counsel's failure to file any motion whatsoever to suppress the drug evidence
and the trial judge failing to sua sponte suppress the evidence. There is an
abundance of relevant case law that was in effect at the time of trial, that
Defendant's counsel ought to have relied upon.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) outlined the reasons why an officer
may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle: "to remove any weapons that
the arrestee might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape and the
[5]

need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence." Id at 457. These are
the two necessities justifying an intrusive search of an arrestee's vehicle. The State
primarily focuses on the need to protect officer safety.
The State asserts that the reason behind the need to search the vehicle in the
instant case was to search for weapons. The State makes this point in the
addendum to their brief with two newspaper articles discussing the violent result of
two situations where a driver pulled a weapon on police officers. The State cites
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) in support of their claim that
prior to Gant an officer can conduct a highly intrusive vehicle search in any
custodial situation. These searches do have exceptions, however, most notably in
State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, 182 P.3d 935. In Baker the Utah Court of
Appeals ruled that the threat posed to officer safety when conducting a traffic stop
is not consequentially incumbent upon all arrests and must be based on the totality
of the circumstances. The police cannot simply search a vehicle or other
passengers without some kind of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is, or
about, to take place. In Baker the police initiated a traffic stop because the license
plate of the car was not illuminated. While walking up to the car the officer noticed
that one of the passengers had a knife on his belt. In the course of the traffic stop
the officer found that the driver's license was suspended from a previous drug
conviction. The officer arrested the driver and waited for the K9 unit to arrive to
[6]

search the vehicle for contraband. The K9 unit arrived; and after smelling the car,
the dog indicated that it had smelled drugs. The officers then searched Baker and
found a glass pipe in his pants pocket and shoe. Baker was subsequently arrested.
The Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and suppressed the evidence.
In State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, P 15, 107 P.3d 706, the Court of
Appeals ruled that "No person may be detained except upon reasonable suspicion,
and the scope of the detention must be limited to addressing the articulated grounds
for the stop." Furthermore the Baker court ruled that:
While it was the early morning hours, and there were four
passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates
any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part
of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible."
Jfoferat938P13
Similarly, in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when "by
the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with
the defendant created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond
the reason he was initially stopped."
The officer who pulled over and arrested Kendell Spanger (the driver of the
vehicle in the instant case) never indicated that he suspected the Defendant of any
criminal activity whatsoever. The only reason, according to the State, that
Spanger5 s vehicle was even searched was for officer safety. There was no worry
[7]

over the destruction of evidence because Spanger was arrested on an outstanding
warrant of no proof of insurance in Layton City. There was utterly no articulable
reason to search the vehicle or search any of the other passengers because where
"officers have no evidence of information implicating a suspect, 'mere presence' in
the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that suspect was involved
in a crime." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1948).
The State legitimately is concerned with officer safety. However, that
interest must be "weighed against society's interest in protecting individual
liberty..." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, P. 25, 78 P.3d 590. In Warren the officer
performed a frisk during a traffic stop to "promote the safety of officers and
others" and stated that he performed such frisks "as a matter of routine on anyone
he orders out of a vehicle." Id. P 6. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that such frisks
violated the Fourth Amendment:
The officer's safety concerns in this case were not sufficient to
outweigh the defendant's right to personal security. In a simple
traffic stop where other indicia of dangerousness are absent,
ordering the occupants out of the car clearly mitigates the inherent
dangerousness of the stop. Id. at P 27.
When viewing the totality of the circumstances there is no justifiable reason
for the police to have suspected any of the passengers of criminality, or even any
wrongdoing. The vehicle had no insurance, an offense worthy of a traffic stop and
a citation, but hardly a dangerous or sadistic offense. There was no reason for the
[8]

officer to take precautionary steps. The defendant in the Baker case admitted to
possessing a number of knives on his person and in the vehicle. That was still not
enough for the officer's to have reason to perform a search of the passengers or of
the vehicle. This stop violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be
secure in his person. Police officers take a substantial risk while initiating a traffic
stop. Similarly, when the police use their authority to question, detain, and search
citizens with absolutely no suspicion of any wrongdoing, then society's interest in
preserving constitutional rights is substantially violated and all of society's values
threatened.
On September 11, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an unpublished
opinion1 in Utah v. Hill, 2009 WL 2902525 (Utah App.) where the facts are almost
identical to the case at bar. In that case the State filed a motion for summary
reversal and was granted per curiam by the Court. In Hill the police initiated a
traffic stop where a passenger of the vehicle was arrested. While doing a search
incident to arrest, the police found narcotics in the vehicle and arrested Hill. This
type of search is now prohibited by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct.1710; 173 L.Ed2d
485 (April, 2009). Although the arrest and conviction occurred before the Gant
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 30(f) Citation of decisions. Published
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and unpublished
decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1, 1998, may be cited
as precedent in all courts of the State. Other unpublished decisions may also be
cited, so long as all parties and the court are supplied with accurate copies at the
time all such decisions are first cited.
[9]

decision was handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court, the State still filed a motion
for summary reversal of Hill's conviction because, by current standards, the search
and subsequent arrest was not justified. This is a practically identical factual
scenario to the instant case. The decision of the State to file a motion of reversal
for a defendant based upon a search that is now outright prohibited by the Gant
decision and to now argue that Gant should not apply retroactively seems patently
unfair to Mr. Larry. The State and the Court of Appeals ought to treat all
defendants by the same standard, on an appellate level, and reverse Mr. Larry's
conviction.
CONCLUSION
Police officers can only remove the passengers of a vehicle and perform a
search if they have reason to feel that their safety is in danger or that evidence may
be destroyed. The danger posed to police officers must be weighed against
society's concern for individual rights and be based upon the totality of the
circumstances. When searching after a traffic stop, the search must be reasonably
related to the underlying purpose behind that stop. The Defendant in the case at bar
was a passenger in the backseat of a vehicle that was being operated without
insurance. The driver was arrested for an outstanding warrant for a similar crime in
Layton City. Driving without insurance does pose a risk to the public, but is not an
especially dangerous offense where the police need to feel that their safety is
[10]

threatened. The officers never reported feeling threatened or that their safety was
on the line. Nonetheless, the Defendant was removed from the vehicle and
searched unlawfully. By not objecting to the illegally seized evidence trial counsel
performance was especially deficient. The evidence ought to have been
suppressed.
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